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INTRODUCTION 
Children are recognized as a vulnerable group because, among 
other attributes, they are young, immature, impressionable, and 
physically smaller than adults.1 These traits make children 
particularly vulnerable to human rights abuses. As conflict ravages 
large portions of the world, children are severely affected by the 
fighting. Sadly, children are often forced to fight in these wars for 
both governmental and non-governmental armed groups. Warring 
parties often abduct children from their homes or internally displaced 
persons camps and force them to fight—targeting them precisely 
because they are impressionable and immature. When children are 
forced to fight they are deprived of security, education, family, and 
other needs essential for a stable upbringing. Child soldiers are 
exposed to extreme violence and live in hostile conditions, which can 
leave permanent emotional and physical scars.  
Regardless of how children end up in armies and rebel groups, 
whether through forced recruitment or “voluntary” enlistment, the 
international community recognizes that children should not be 
fighting wars.2 There are a variety of international and national 
instruments that prohibit warring factions from conscripting 
children.3 First, this paper discusses the global use of child soldiers, 
 
 1. See United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, pmbl., opened 
for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) 
[hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the Child]; Declaration of the Rights of 
the Child, G.A. Res. 1386, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1386(XIV) (Nov. 20, 1959); 
Samantha Besson, The Principle of Non-Discrimination in the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, 13 Int’l J. Child. Rts. 433, 433 (2005) (noting that children are 
especially susceptible to being targeted based on their gender, religion, or race). 
 2. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict art. 1, May 25, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S. 
222 [hereinafter Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict]; Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) (defining children as persons under the age of 
eighteen); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 77, June 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I] (defining children as 
persons under the age of fifteen). 
 3. Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(c)-(c)(2) (2008); 
Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2442, 3300 (2008); 
Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 2, art. 1; Rome 
Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi) ; Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 
77. 
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the legal framework regarding child soldiers, and state obligations to 
protect the rights of children.  Next, this paper argues that 
international and national instruments create extraterritorial 
obligations for states to prevent the use of child soldiers beyond their 
own borders. Lastly, this paper examines U.S. extraterritorial 
obligations regarding child soldiers and the country’s ability to 
uphold its obligations.  
II. THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS 
Images of young children draped in bullets and carrying an AK-47 
are increasingly common. Government armies and rebel groups 
throughout the world have conscripted children into their armies, 
forcing them to fight on the front lines, carry provisions, act as 
couriers, and serve as sex slaves. The Coalition to Stop Child 
Soldiers has reported that between 2004 and 2007 government and 
rebel forces in twenty-one countries were using child soldiers.4 In 
2010, the U.S. State Department reported that government forces in 
at least six countries used child soldiers: Chad, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Sudan, Yemen, Burma, and Somalia.5   
Over the past ten years, Human Rights Watch has released 
numerous reports documenting the use of child soldiers throughout 
the world. In 2004, Liberian opposition groups and government 
forces used approximately 15,000 child soldiers.6 Children were 
 
 4. COAL. TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, CHILD SOLDIERS GLOBAL 
REPORT 2008 12, 15 (2008), available at http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/ 
[hereinafter CHILD SOLDIERS REPORT 2008] (explaining that at least eighty-six 
countries and territories still employ forms of recruitment of children under 
eighteen). 
 5. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 10 (10th ed. 2010) 
[hereinafter TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT]; cf. Howard LaFranchi, Obama 
waives sanctions for four countries that use child soldiers, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Oct. 29, 2010, 7:53 PM), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-
Policy/2010/1029/Obama-waives-sanctions-for-four-countries-that-use-child-
soldiers (discussing President Obama’s waiver of sanctions on four of the six 
recognized governments using child soldiers); Brian Knowlton, 4 Nations With 
Child Soldiers Keep U.S. Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/29/world/africa/29soldiers.html (observing that 
the only countries that President Obama did not waive sanctions for were Somalia 
and Myanmar). 
 6. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HOW TO FIGHT, HOW TO KILL: CHILD 
SOLDIERS IN LIBERIA 1 (2004) [hereinafter CHILD SOLDIERS IN LIBERIA] (noting 
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kidnapped, sexually abused, forced to fight, and exposed to the 
amputation of enemy fighter extremities. 7 In Nepal, the Maoist 
rebels used children to carry provisions and ammunition to the 
frontlines.8 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri 
Lanka recruited children as young as eleven years old to fight for 
them.9  
In Chad, Rwanda, and Uganda, government and paramilitary 
forces have conscripted children. In Chad, Human Rights Watch 
reported the use of underage children in various regions of the 
country, and the U.S. State Department has said the same.10 One 
Chadian boy said, “The village is not safe; it is better to go to war.”11 
As in Liberia, children were forced to fight or were living in such 
dire conditions that fighting seemed like a better option than staying 
at home.12 During the Rwandan genocide, children were forced to 
kill other children, steal property, and seek out people in hiding.13 A 
reported 5,000 children were abducted by the Lord’s Resistance 
 
that some military units consisted primarily of boy and girl soldiers under 18 years 
old). 
 7. Id. at 2, 22-23. 
 8. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: CIVILIANS 
STRUGGLE TO SURVIVE IN NEPAL’S CIVIL WAR 60-61 (2004) [hereinafter NEPAL’S 
CIVIL WAR] (discussing the Maoist effort to raise a militia of over fifty thousand 
children to replenish depleted ranks). 
 9. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LIVING IN FEAR: CHILD SOLDIERS AND THE 
TAMIL TIGERS IN SRI LANKA 2 (2004) [hereinafter CHILD SOLDIERS IN SRI LANKA] 
(explaining that rebels forced parents to contribute at least one child to the 
movement in order to avoid violent retaliation). 
 10. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 5, at 10; HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, EARLY TO WAR: CHILD SOLDIERS IN THE CHAD CONFLICT 17-19 (2007) 
[hereinafter CHILD SOLDIERS IN CHAD] (reporting that some child soldiers are used 
by Sudanese rebel groups that receive support from the Chadian government); see 
also  Knowlton, supra note 5 (noting that the government of Chad has recruited 
refugee children for active armed conflicts against rebel forces). 
 11. See CHILD SOLIDERS IN CHAD, supra note 10, at 22 (telling the story of one 
twelve-year-old boy who refused to idly “wait in the village to die” and instead 
joined the combatants to seek revenge for the death of his family). 
 12. CHILD SOLDIERS IN LIBERIA, supra note 6, at 9 (explaining that some 
children seek protection for their families by joining the forces that previously 
abused them). 
 13. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LASTING WOUNDS: CONSEQUENCES OF 
GENOCIDE AND WAR ON RWANDA’S CHILDREN 13 (2003) [hereinafter 
CONSEQUENCES OF GENOCIDE ON RWANDA’S CHILDREN] (discussing that child 
soldiers participated in the gamut of genocide by committing murder and rape). 
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Army in northern Uganda from 2002 to 2003, with the total estimate 
from 1986 to 2002 reaching about 20,000 children.14  
In the past, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers has 
criticized the United Kingdom, arguing that it has used child soldiers 
by recruiting children into its army at the age of sixteen.15 Although 
the U.K. signed the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children 
in armed conflict, at the time of ratification it declared that the 
government would deploy soldiers under eighteen in situations where 
there is “genuine military need.”16 The U.K. has since deployed 
soldiers under the age of eighteen to combat zones in Iraq.17  
In regions throughout the world, children are forced into conflict. 
Their minds are impressionable and exposure to extreme violence 
can permanently harm the children if they are not first killed in the 
conflict. The use of child soldiers has been condemned through both 
international treaties and national laws that create obligations for 
states to prohibit the use of child soldiers.18   
III.LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
In response to their widespread use, states have taken action to 
prevent and punish the use of child soldiers. A variety of 
international conventions and documents exist to prevent armed 
 
 14. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STOLEN CHILDREN: ABDUCTION AND 
RECRUITMENT IN NORTHERN UGANDA 2 (2003) [hereinafter STOLEN CHILDREN IN 
UGANDA] (noting a dramatic increase in abductions in 2002 compared to 2001, 
when fewer than 100 children were abducted). 
 15. Greg Barrow, UK ‘shamed’ over teenage soldiers, B.B.C. NEWS, June 12, 
2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1383998.stm. 
 16. See Jo Becker, Children as Weapons of War, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
WORLD REPORT 2004 (2004), available at http://www/hrw.org/en/n 
ews/2004/01/25/children-weapons-war (singling out the U.K. out as the only 
European country that continues to send soldiers under the age of eighteen into 
combat). 
 17. See Under-18s Were Deployed to Iraq, B.B.C. NEWS, Feb. 4, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6328771.stm (explaining that fifteen seventeen-year-old 
soldiers were inadvertently sent to Iraq between June 2003 and July 2005; 
however, no seventeen-year-olds have been deployed since July 2005). 
 18. Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(c)-(c)(2) (2008); 
Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2442, 3300 (2008); 
Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 2, art. 1; Rome 
Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi); Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, art. 
77. 
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groups from using child soldiers. International courts have also 
issued arrest warrants and prosecuted individuals for the crime of 
conscripting children.19 Although there are a number of instruments 
and judicial opinions concerning child soldiers, the most specific 
legally-binding instrument regarding the use of child soldiers is the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (“Optional 
Protocol”).20  
A. THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD  
The most significant legally-binding document regarding 
children’s rights is the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(“CRC”)21 and its two optional protocols: one on the sale of children, 
child prostitution, and child pornography,22 and the other on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict.23 States negotiated the 
CRC in November 1989, and less than one year later it entered into 
force.24 There are currently 193 States Parties to the CRC, making it 
one of the most signed treaties.25 The CRC defines children as 
anyone eighteen years old or younger and recognizes the rights of 
 
 19. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, Prosecution’s Second 
Amended Indictment, ¶ 22 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone May 29, 2007) (asserting 
that Taylor’s actions directly promoted the abduction and use of soldiers under the 
age of fifteen during the Sierra Leone civil war between 1996 and 2002); 
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-203-05-I, Indictment, ¶ 46  (Spec. Ct. for 
Sierra Leone Mar. 7, 2003) (accusing Sesay of being a senior officer who directly 
approved the use of child soldiers); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, & Gbao, Case No. 
SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, ¶ 6 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone Mar. 2, 2009) 
(prosecuting three individuals for “enlisting or conscripting children under the age 
15 or using them to participate actively in hostilities”). 
 20. Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 2, art. 1. 
 21. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1. 
 22. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and on the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex II, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/54/263 (Mar. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Optional Protocol on Sale of 
Children]. 
 23. Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 2. 
 24. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1. 
 25. Status of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. TREATY SERVICE 
(June 26, 2011), http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volu me%20I/Cha 
pter%20IV/IV-11.en.pdf. 
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children by creating legally binding obligations for States Parties.26  
The Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict is most pertinent to the issue of child soldiers. There are 
currently 142 States Parties to the Protocol, including the United 
States.27 States negotiated the protocol in 2000, and it entered into 
force in 2002.28 The Protocol creates legally-binding obligations 
regarding the prohibition of the use of child soldiers, and States 
Parties are obligated to abide by all the provisions of the Protocol to 
satisfy international law.29  
The Optional Protocol completely prohibits the use of children in 
conflict, defining a “child” as someone who is under eighteen years 
old.30 The Protocol specifically provides that neither governmental 
forces nor non-governmental actors may use child soldiers.31  Under 
international law, because states sign treaties, they are normally the 
ones that are legally bound by the treaties’ obligations.32 However, 
since the use of child soldiers has been considered an egregious act, 
and non-state actors often use children in their armies, this Optional 
Protocol took the step of specifically including non-state actors.33 
Human Rights Watch has systematically reported the use of child 
soldiers by non-state actors in countries such as Uganda (by the 
Lord’s Resistance Army),34 Sri Lanka (by the LTTE),35 and Nepal 
 
 26. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, arts. 1, 2. 
 27. Status of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, U.N. TREATY SERVICE (June 26, 
2011), 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-
11-b.en.pdf. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (setting forth the principal of pacta sunt servanda that requires States 
to uphold their treaty duties in good faith). 
 30. See Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 2, art. 1;  
cf. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, art. 38 (prohibiting the 
conscription of children under age fifteen). 
 31. Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 2, arts. 1, 2, 
4. 
 32. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 29, arts. 6, 26; cf., 
e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(holding that corporations cannot be held liable for violations of international law 
because corporations do not sign treaties). 
 33. See Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 2, art. 4. 
 34. STOLEN CHILDREN IN UGANDA, supra note 14, at 2. 
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(by the Maoists).36 These are but three examples amongst many 
more, and the international community has recognized the fact that 
states are not the only actors using child soldiers.  
In recognition of this fact and the severity of the crime of using 
child soldiers, states created the Optional Protocol to specifically 
include an article referring to non-state actors. Article 4 provides that 
“[a]rmed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State 
should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities 
persons under the age of 18 years.”37 Recognizing that States, as 
treaty signatories, are those responsible for treaty implementation, 
the second part of Article 4 provides that States Parties must take 
measures to prevent the recruitment and use of child soldiers.38  
The Protocol spells out the steps that states must take within their 
jurisdiction and sets forth the obligation of states to provide 
assistance outside their jurisdiction. States must strive to ensure that 
any children in combat are demobilized and reintegrated into 
society.39 Article 7 provides that all States Parties to the protocol 
must cooperate to ensure the complete implementation of the 
protocol.40 State obligations include providing financial and technical 
assistance to other States Parties and taking measures to prevent any 
action that might be contrary to the Protocol.41 The idea of 
“international cooperation” that is outlined in Article 7 is essential to 
international law because it ensures that all States Parties help each 
other uphold their obligations.  
B. ADDITIONAL INSTRUMENTS CONDEMNING THE USE OF CHILD 
SOLDIERS  
Although the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child specifically addresses the use of child soldiers, a number of 
other instruments incorporate articles relating to child soldiers. 
 
 35. CHILD SOLIDERS IN SRI LANKA, supra note 9, at 2. 
 36. NEPAL’S CIVIL WAR, supra note 8, at 60. 
 37. Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 2, art. 4. 
 38. Id.(“States Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent such 
recruitment and use, including the adoption of legal measures necessary to prohibit 
and criminalize such practices”). 
 39. Id. art. 6. 
 40. Id. art. 7. 
 41. Id. arts. 6, 7. 
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Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, relating to 
international armed conflict, prohibits states from recruiting children 
under the age of fifteen and requires that states take measures to 
ensure that children under the age of fifteen do not take part in 
hostilities.42 Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
relating to non-international armed conflict, imposes the same 
requirements as the first protocol: states shall not recruit children 
under fifteen to the armed forces and children under age fifteen may 
not take up arms.43 The prohibition of the use of child soldiers in 
these Additional Protocols is essential because the Geneva 
Conventions and their Additional Protocols have risen to the level of 
customary international law, meaning that all states are obligated to 
abide by them regardless of whether they have signed the treaties.44  
Additionally, the International Labor Organization Convention 
Number 182 (“ILO Convention 182”) prohibits the conscription of 
children into the armed forces.45 States negotiated the ILO 
Convention 182 on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child 
Labor in 1999, and the Convention came into force in 2000.46 Article 
3 includes the forced recruitment of children into the armed forces as 
one of the worst forms of child labor, and expressly prohibits it.47   
Furthermore, other instruments have been created regarding the 
use of child soldiers. The UN Security Council has passed numerous 
 
 42. Additional Protocol I, supra note 2, at 77. 
 43. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 
4(3)(c), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II] 
(reiterating that even if children are deployed, they are still entitled to special 
protections). 
 44. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, The Grave Breaches Regime as Customary 
International Law, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 683, 685 (2009) (asserting that the 
Geneva Conventions are understood to be customary international law largely 
because of universal ratification, and stating that it has “long been recognized that 
treaty law can provide the blueprint for future behaviour and lay the foundation of 
the development of customary rules.”). 
 45. International Labour Organization, Convention Concerning the Prohibition 
and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour 
arts. 1-3, June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter Convention on Worst 
Forms of Child Labour] (defining children as those under eighteen). 
 46. Id. art. 10; see Ratifications of Convention No. C182, ILO (June 26, 2011), 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C182 (noting 174 states have ratified 
the convention). 
 47. See Convention on Worst Forms of Child Labour, supra note 45, art. 3. 
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resolutions calling on states to prohibit the use of children in armed 
conflict.48 Additionally, in 2007, UNICEF and the French Foreign 
Ministry held a meeting in Paris called “Free Children From War,” 
where fifty-nine UN states participated and endorsed two outcome 
documents that create political commitments for states to uphold.49 
One of the documents is a series of commitments based on current 
legal obligations regarding child soldiers, and the other is a detailed 
set of principles relating to the protection of children from 
participation in armed conflict and to the reintegration of child 
soldiers into society after they have stopped fighting.50 The creation 
of these documents and resolutions demonstrate both the UN’s and 
states’ commitment to prevent the use of child soldiers and to assist 
children who are forced to fight.  
C. JUDICIAL PRECEDENT  
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court contains 
provisions relating to criminal accountability for recruiting and using 
child soldiers in both international and non-international armed 
conflict.51 The Rome Statute establishes a permanent court to try 
individuals charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
 
 48. See S.C. Res. 1612, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1612 (July 26, 2005); S.C. Res. 
1539, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1539 (Apr. 22, 2004 (noting a lack of progress towards the 
eradication of child soldiers); S.C. Res. 1460, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1460 (Jan. 30, 
2003); S.C. Res. 1379, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1379 (Nov. 20, 2001); S.C. Res. 
1314, ¶ 4, 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1414 (Aug. 11, 2000); S.C. Res. 1261, ¶ 2, 13, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1261 (Aug. 25, 1999) (urging states to intensify their efforts to 
end the use of children in armed conflict). 
 49. The Paris Commitments, Feb. 5-6, 2007, The Paris Commitments to 
Protect Children From Unlawful Recruitment or Use by Armed Forces or Armed 
Groups, ¶¶ 3, 4, available at http://www.un.org/children/conflict/_d 
ocuments/pariscommitments/ParisCommitments_EN.pdf [hereinafter The Paris 
Commitments]; The Paris Principles, Feb. 5-6, 2007, The Principles and 
Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, ¶¶ 3.11-
3.13, available at http://www.un.org/children/conflict/_documents/paris 
principles/ParisPrinciples_EN.pdf [hereinafter The Paris Principles]; see generally 
Paris Conference, Feb. 5-6, 2007, Free Children from War, available at 
http://www.unicef.org/protection/files/Attendees.pdf (listing the 59 participating 
countries). 
 50. See The Paris Commitments, supra note 49, ¶¶ 5-20; The Paris Principles, 
supra note 49, ¶¶ 3.11, 3.12. 
 51. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi), 8(2)(e)(vii) (establishing the 
recruitment of children under fifteen as a war crime). 
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aggression, and genocide.52 Within these definitions, the Rome 
Statute considers the recruitment of children under age fifteen to be a 
war crime.53  
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has tried individuals for 
the crime of recruiting and using children under age fifteen. In 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, the first case before the ICC, the court heard 
the case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, who commanded rebel forces in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo.54 The prosecutor accused him of 
the war crimes of conscripting, enlisting, and using children under 
age fifteen in non-international armed conflict.55 The fact that the 
Rome Statute includes the use of child soldiers as a war crime and 
the fact that the ICC tried someone accused of this crime in its first 
trial shows that the international community considers the use of 
child soldiers to be an egregious crime and that it is willing to punish 
those who commit this crime.  
The Special Court of Sierra Leone, a hybrid court established to 
try individuals accused of war crimes during Sierra Leone’s civil 
war, has also tried individuals for the use of child soldiers.56 The 
Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone criminalized the use of 
 
 52. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 1, 5. 
 53. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi). The Rome Statute uses the age of under fifteen 
because it relies on the Geneva Conventions.  Id. art. (8)(2)(a). 
 54. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 9 (Int’l Crim. Ct. Jan. 29, 2007) 
(charging Lubanga with “the war crimes of conscripting and enlisting children 
under the age of fifteen years into an armed group . . . and using them to participate 
in hostilities”); see also Lubanga Case, COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=drctimelinelubanga (last visited 
July 14, 2011); DRC: ICC’s First Trial Focuses on Child Soldiers, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/22/drc-icc-s-first-
trial-focuses-child-soldiers. 
 55. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 at ¶ 9 (alleging that Lubanga started 
recruiting children in September 2002). 
 56. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone arts. 1, 4, Jan. 16, 2002, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 145 [hereinafter SCSL Statute]; see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, 
Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, Prosecution’s Second Amended Indictment, ¶ 22 (Spec. 
Ct. for Sierra Leone May 29, 2007); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-203-05-
I, Indictment, ¶ 46 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone Mar. 7, 2003); Prosecutor v. Sesay, 
Kallon, & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, ¶ 6 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra 
Leone Mar. 2, 2009);  Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-03-12-I, 
Indictment, ¶ 24 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone June 24, 2003). 
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children under age fifteen in armed conflict;57 the statute, however, 
does not define the use of child soldiers as a war crime, but rather as 
a “serious violation of international humanitarian law.”58 In 2007, the 
Court convicted three individuals, Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy 
Kamara, and Santigie Borbor Kanu, of committing war crimes 
during the Sierra Leonean conflict, and of committing “other serious 
violations of international law, including the use of child soldiers.”59 
Charles Taylor, Issan Sesay, and Allieu Kondewa also stood trial for 
the use of child soldiers.60 The provision on the prohibition of child 
soldiers has been used against individuals who participated in the 
Sierra Leonean conflict, showing a strong aversion to the crime and 
the severe repercussions for its violations.  
There are a vast number of widely accepted international 
instruments, from treaties to resolutions, prohibiting the recruitment 
and use of child soldiers. Furthermore, international courts have 
upheld the existence of the international crime of using child soldiers 
and have tried people specifically for this crime. The widespread 
acceptance of an international norm prohibiting the use of child 
soldiers shows the customary nature of the prohibition and the 
universal need to uphold the obligation to prevent the use of child 
soldiers.  
IV.STATE OBLIGATIONS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW  
Under international law, states have legally-binding obligations 
 
 57. SCSL Statute, supra note 56, art. 4. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial 
Judgment, ¶¶ 2113, 2117, 2121 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone July 20, 2007) (ruling 
that each of the three men were guilty of conscripting or using soldiers under the 
age of 15 to participate in active warfare); Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, & Kanu, 
Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone Feb. 
22, 2008) (dismissing all grounds for defendants’ appeals, thereby upholding the 
trial court’s determination of guilt); Child Soldiers—Developments, COALITION TO 
STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, http://www.child-soldiers.org/childsoldiers/leg 
al-framework (last visited July 14, 2011) (reporting that all three defendants were 
sentenced to over 45 years of imprisonment). 
 60. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, ¶ 22; Sesay, Case No. SCSL-203-05-I, ¶ 
46; Sesay, Kallon, & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, ¶ 6; Kondewa, Case No. 
SCSL-03-12-I, ¶ 24. 
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that they must uphold. Traditionally, states are only responsible for 
obligations in the conventions that they have signed. Therefore states 
can voluntarily take on obligations and can only be held to the 
obligations they have signed on to. Most treaties obligate states to 
take action in support of, or refrain from taking action against, 
people within their territory or jurisdiction.61 This is based on the 
traditional notion of state sovereignty, whereby states are only 
responsible for people within their jurisdiction.62 As this section 
details, there are obligations that states must fulfill even though the 
obligations fall outside the jurisdiction or territory of the state. These 
obligations are called “extraterritorial obligations.” 
The existence of extraterritorial obligations is not globally 
accepted, and scholars note that these obligations are emerging as the 
world becomes more globalized.63 The political and economic nature 
of the globalizing world forces states to constantly interact with other 
states. People continuously travel and migrate throughout the world, 
seeking jobs, safety, and freedom. This globalization further leads to 
the argument that states should be responsible for how their actions 
affect people outside of their borders. This section outlines where 
 
 61. For example, Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights states that “[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect 
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant” (emphasis added); disarmament treaties 
such as the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel 
Mines and their Destruction specifically obligate states to destroy weapons within 
their jurisdiction and territory. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention on 
Cluster Munitions art. 3, May. 30, 2008, CCM/77 (entered into force Aug. 1, 
2010), available at http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/ENGLISH 
finaltext.pdf; Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production 
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction arts. 4, 5, Sep. 18, 
1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211 [hereinafter Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines]. 
 62. See Sigrun Skogly & Mark Gibney, Introduction, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS 1 (Mark Gibney & Sigrun Skogly 
eds., 2010) (chronicling a shift from the traditional view of state sovereignty to a 
modern view that recognizes the fluidity of state sovereignty due to globalization). 
 63. See id. (explaining that, in the past, international human rights law has 
focused on what domestic governments are doing in terms of human rights; 
however, in an interdependent, globalized world it is equally important to assess 
the effect of other actors such as: intergovernmental organizations, international 
private entities, and foreign states). 
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extraterritorial obligations can be found and why there is an 
extraterritorial obligation regarding the use of child soldiers.  
A. GENERAL STATE OBLIGATIONS 
Under international law there are three main actions that states 
must undertake to uphold the rights of people in their jurisdiction: 
the obligation to respect, to protect, and to fulfill each right.64 The 
language creating each obligation is normally codified in a treaty.  
The duty to respect provides that a state must refrain from 
violating the rights codified in a treaty. Article 2 of the CRC begins 
by stating that “States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set 
forth in the present Convention to each child. . . .”65 The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights similarly provides that 
“[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and 
to ensure to all individuals . . . the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant . . . .”66 The use of this language obligates states to not 
violate the rights provided in those conventions. This means that if a 
state signs the Convention on the Rights of the Child it cannot then 
prohibit children from attending schools or accessing medical care, 
which are protected rights within the Convention.67  
The duty to protect provides that a state must try to avoid 
violations of the rights set forth in a treaty by other individuals or 
entities. The CRC addresses protection in Article 19 by stating:  
States Parties shall take all appropriate . . . measures to 
protect the child from all forms of physical or mental 
violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, 
maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in 
the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person 
who has the care of the child.68 
This language requires that a State Party take responsibility for 
other actors—namely the parents or guardians of a child—to ensure 
children’s safety. The state, therefore, is responsible for making sure 
 
 64. HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. 
FOREIGN POLICY 52 (2d ed. 1996). 
 65. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, art. 2. 
 66. See ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 2. 
 67. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, arts. 24, 28. 
 68. See id. art. 19. 
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that children’s rights are not violated by third parties.  
The duty to fulfill provides that a state must make remedies 
available for violations of rights provided for in a treaty. The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, 
provides that “[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes . . . to ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as 
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy . . . .”69 
A remedy would normally include access to a judicial system so that 
someone who has had her rights violated can file a lawsuit and seek a 
remedy, either pecuniary or non-pecuniary. To have a remedy 
available, a state must have a functioning judicial system and 
national laws that allow an individual to file suit regarding the 
violation of her rights codified in the applicable convention.  
B. EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS 
 While states have national duties to protect, fulfill, and 
respect, they also have extraterritorial obligations. Extraterritorial 
obligations are those obligations that a state owes to persons outside 
of its territory or jurisdiction. One of the UN Special Rapporteurs 
noted that, especially given our globalizing world, one country’s 
action often impacts another country.70 Therefore, states should 
ensure that their policies and actions will not result in human rights 
violations in another country.71 An extraterritorial obligation, for 
example, would include refraining from dumping waste in a river 
that ends in another country whose residents would be harmed by the 
waste.  
In her article on state responsibility, Monica Hakimi notes that 
there are three approaches to determine if a state has an 
extraterritorial obligation.72 The decisive factors for determining 
 
 69. See ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 2 (requiring a remedy even for violations 
caused by officials). 
 70. See Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, The Right to Food, ¶ 28, 
Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/44 (Mar. 16, 2006) (by Jean 
Ziegler) [hereinafter Right to Food] (discussing the impact of national agricultural 
policies on the right to food of individuals in other nations). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Monica Hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
341, 376-77 (2010) (recognizing extraterritoriality as one of the most contentious 
issues in human rights law). 
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extraterritorial obligations include the state’s: “(1) control over the 
rights holder; (2) control over the territory in which the abuse occurs; 
or (3) influence over the abuser.”73 Although the second approach is 
widely accepted by human rights experts, Hakimi rejects the first two 
approaches for too narrowly construing the theory of extraterritorial 
obligations, and opines that the third approach proves the most 
useful.74  
The “influence over abuser” approach gives guidance in how to 
determine a state’s responsibility to uphold its obligations. 
“Influence” refers to a state’s ability to affect the actions of non-state 
actors or another state, primarily through incentives or threats. If a 
state has influence over another state or actor who may violate 
human rights, the influential state has an obligation to prevent that 
state or actor from taking illegal actions. 
C. FINDING EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
INSTRUMENTS 
Generally, the creation of an extraterritorial obligation can be 
distilled from the language of certain treaties. The UN Charter 
outlines the function of the UN and of all UN member states in 
relation to UN goals and objectives.75 Most countries are UN 
members, and every state party to the CRC is a UN member.76 In 
terms of extraterritorial obligations created by the UN Charter, one 
such obligation can be read into the language in Articles 55 and 56, 
which must be read together.77  
Article 55 and 56 of the UN Charter are contained in Chapter IX 
regarding “International Economic and Social Co-operation.” Article 
55 addresses the goals of the UN in regards to a variety of economic 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. at 377-78 (noting that the third approach cures some of the 
deficiencies in the other two approaches because it focuses on the state’s 
relationship with the abuser and does not rely on the notion of control). 
 75. U.N. Charter art. 55. 
 76. Compare Status of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 25 
(reporting 140 signatories to the Convention), with Member States of the United 
Nations, U.N., http://www.un.org/en/members/ (last visited July 15, 2011) 
(reflecting the membership of 192 states in the United Nations). 
 77. U.N. Charter arts. 55, 56 (instructing member states, in article 56, to take 
action to achieve the purposes of article 55). 
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and social issues. It provides that the “. . . United Nations shall 
promote: . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all . . . .”78 Bruno Simma’s 
commentary on Article 55 notes that the article contains a 
“universality” aspect, which ensures that all states respect human 
rights and that all “individuals should benefit equally from the 
protection of human rights.”79 Article 56 provides that “[a]ll 
Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-
operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes 
set forth in Article 55.”80 Since Article 56 obligates all UN member 
states to uphold, through whatever means possible, the provisions of 
Article 55 including the universal respect for human rights, it can be 
argued that this creates an extraterritorial obligation for states to 
support human rights in other countries. This would then create an 
extraterritorial obligation through which states must promote human 
rights outside of their own countries.   
Language regarding “international cooperation and assistance” 
contained in treaties also creates extraterritorial obligations. Most 
treaties contain this type of language to different degrees. The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
provides that “[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes 
to take steps, individually and through international assistance and 
co-operation . . . with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means . . . .”81 In a recent article, Arne Vandenbogaerde 
noted that scholars read this language to include extraterritorial 
obligations “to respect, to protect and to fulfill ESC [economic, 
social and cultural] rights in other countries . . . .”82 Since the 
 
 78. Id. art. 55 (emphasis added). 
 79. Bruno Simma, International Economic and Social Co-operation, in 2 THE 
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 923, 924 (Bruno Simma ed., 
2d ed. 2002). 
 80. U.N. Charter art. 56. 
 81. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2, ¶ 1, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 82. Arne Vandenbogaerde & Wouter Vandenhole, The Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: An Ex Ante 
Assessment of Its Effectiveness in Light of the Drafting Process, 10 Hum. Rts. L. 
Rev. 207, 227 (2010) (documenting the highly politicized discussion around the 
legal obligation to provide international assistance and cooperation). 
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language provides for the progressive realization of rights through all 
appropriate means, this includes taking measures to uphold rights–
and to refrain from violating rights–of people living outside a state’s 
borders.   
UN reports have also referenced extraterritorial obligations of 
states. Although these reports are not legally binding, they are highly 
influential and should be respected and upheld by states. In 2006, the 
UN Commission on Human Rights released a report on “the right to 
food” with a section relating specifically to extraterritorial 
obligations regarding food access.83 The report discusses the issue of 
international agricultural trade affecting some countries detrimentally 
and advocates that states have extraterritorial obligations to respect, 
protect, and fulfill the right to food.84 These obligations require states 
to ensure that their policies do not lead to human rights violations 
elsewhere, that actors within the state’s jurisdiction do not take 
actions that will violate rights in another country, and that states are 
supporting other countries’ ability to fulfill their right to food.85 
These carefully outlined obligations demonstrate the UN’s 
commitment to and support of the idea of extraterritorial obligations 
to ensure that one state’s actions do not lead to the violation of rights 
in another state.  
Under customary international law, extraterritorial obligations are 
not firmly established, but they are emerging.86 References to 
obligations outside of a States Parties territory exist in international 
conventions, and non-binding UN commentaries specifically discuss 
extraterritorial obligations. This shows a rising acceptance of 
extraterritorial obligations. 
D. DOES THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF 
CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT CREATE AN EXTRATERRITORIAL 
OBLIGATION?  
The Optional Protocol regarding child soldiers does create an 
 
 83. See Right to Food, supra note 70, ¶¶ 28-38. 
 84. Id. ¶¶ 35-37. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Hakimi, supra note 72, at 377-78 (recognizing that the approach to 
extraterritoriality has often been based on confused reasoning and inconsistent 
application). 
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extraterritorial obligation for states. Primarily, states have an 
obligation to uphold the right of all children to not be conscripted. 
This obligation provides that states should take no actions that would 
lead to another state’s or non-state actor’s use or recruitment of child 
soldiers.  
Examining the language of the Optional Protocol is essential to 
determining the existence of an extraterritorial obligation to prevent 
the use of child soldiers. Article 7 addresses the area of international 
cooperation and assistance and states that all “States Parties shall 
cooperate . . . in the prevention of any activity contrary to the 
Protocol . . . .”87 The main provisions in the Protocol require a 
prohibition on the conscription of soldiers under eighteen years old 
by both states88 and non-state actors.89 It also requires States Parties 
to create “legal, administrative and other measures” to implement the 
Protocol within their jurisdictions.90 These provisions require states 
to prevent the use of child soldiers within their jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, reading Article 7 with the overall provisions of the 
Protocol shows that States Parties commit to trying to prevent the use 
of child soldiers in any country (“ . . . cooperate . . . in the prevention 
of any activity contrary to the Protocol . . .”).  
Using Hakimi’s “influence over the abuser” approach to 
extraterritorial obligations proves useful in this situation.91 From this 
perspective, a state that has influence over another state—by 
affecting the other state’s actions—hereby has a responsibility to 
promote the abidance of the treaty. In relation to the use of child 
soldiers, if state A can influence the policy and activities of state B, 
and both are States Parties to the Optional Protocol, then state A has 
a responsibility to influence the activities of state B to ensure that 
state B is not violating the Protocol. For example, if state A provides 
military or technical assistance to state B, state A should not provide 
this type of assistance if it knows that state B uses child soldiers. 
Otherwise state A’s international assistance would actually promote 
 
 87. See Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 2, art. 7. 
 88. Id. art. 2. 
 89. Id. art. 4. 
 90. Id. art. 6. 
 91. See Hakimi, supra note 72, at 377-79 (discussing the application of the 
influence-based approach to scenarios where the other two approaches proved to 
be too narrow in scope). 
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the use of child soldiers rather than prevent it and would thus violate 
the Optional Protocol.  
The theory of extraterritorial obligations comes up frequently in 
regard to arms transfers. In 2006, the UN General Assembly passed a 
resolution calling for an arms trade treaty to ensure that states 
exporting arms were not exporting to parties outside of their 
territorial jurisdiction that would use the weapons to commit human 
rights abuses.92 The resolution acknowledged that arms control is 
essential for maintaining international peace and security, and 
recognized the detrimental impact that unrestricted weapons sales 
can have on human rights.93  
In a recent essay, Barbara Frey, the former UN Special Rappateur 
for Small Arms and Human Rights, argues that an extraterritorial 
obligation exists regarding the transfer of small arms and light 
weapons.94 Part of Frey’s argument hinges on the right to life being a 
peremptory international norm which, therefore, must be upheld by 
all states.95  Barcelona Traction, an International Court of Justice 
case, famously declared that the right to life is erga omnes, meaning 
that it is an obligation owed to the international community as a 
whole and that the international community as a whole has a legal 
interest in upholding it.96 Therefore, according to Frey, the 
irresponsible transfer of small arms and light weapons can lead to the 
violation of a peremptory norm, which is impermissible under 
international law.  
Expanding Frey’s argument that the nature of the right to life as an 
international peremptory norm creates an extraterritorial obligation 
 
 92. See G.A. Res. 61/89, ¶¶ 1, 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/89 (Dec. 18, 2006) 
(establishing a group of experts to study the issue and draft the parameters of the 
treaty). 
 93. Id. (considering the international legal structures protecting human rights 
while proposing further restrictions on the international sale of conventional arms). 
 94. Barbara Frey, Obligations to Protect the Right to Life: Constructing a Rule 
of Transfer Regarding Small Arms and Light Weapons, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS 35 (Mark Gibney & Sigrun Skogly 
eds., 2010) [hereinafter Obligations to Protect] (looking to both the ICCPR as well 
as arms embargoes). 
 95. See id. (recognizing that the right has been generated by both customary 
international law and treaties). 
 96. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. 
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 50, ¶ 33 (Feb. 5, 1970). 
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regarding arms transfers, the obligation to uphold the right to life 
extends to preventing the use of child soldiers. In other words, a state 
taking actions that would support the use of child soldiers in another 
country should be seen as violating the peremptory norm of the right 
to life. Due to the heightened probability of death for a conscripted 
child, conscripting a child puts the right to life in more jeopardy than 
conscripting an adult. Therefore, based similar to Frey’s argument 
regarding the affect of weapons transfers on the right to life, there is 
an extraterritorial obligation to prevent the use of child soldiers 
because conscription of children jeopardizes the right to life.  
There is widespread international condemnation of the use of child 
soldiers. There are currently 142 States Parties to the Optional 
Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, and the 
U.S. government reported this year that it knows of only six 
government forces that are using child soldiers.97  Since such a large 
number of countries prohibit the use of child soldiers within their 
own borders and recognize the horrifically damaging effects of 
fighting as a child, it is illogical for these countries to not try, within 
their means and without abrogating state sovereignty, to prevent the 
use of child soldiers in other countries. This tends to show that the 
norm of prohibiting the use of child soldiers, coupled with the 
extensive treaty law preventing their use, creates an extraterritorial 
obligation to prevent the use of child soldiers and protect children 
from conscription.   
V. U.S. OBLIGATIONS  
The United States is a State Party to the Optional Protocol on the 
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict, which creates legally-binding obligations for the United 
States to uphold its obligations, and the United States has passed 
national legislation regarding the use of child soldiers.98 This section, 
premised on the argument that there is an extraterritorial obligation 
to prevent the use of child soldiers, seeks to determine whether the 
 
 97. Status of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 27; TRAFFICKING IN 
PERSONS REPORT, supra note 5, at 10. 
 98. Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(c)-(c)(2)(2008); 
Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2442, 3300 (2008). 
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U.S. recognizes this obligation, and how it upholds the obligation if 
recognized.  
VI.DOES THE U.S. RECOGNIZE THIS 
EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATION? 
After signing the Optional Protocol, the U.S. Congress passed two 
pieces of national legislation regarding child soldiers–the Child 
Soldiers Prevention Act and the Child Soldiers Accountability Act.99 
In order to uphold its obligations under the Optional Protocol, the 
United States had to draft this national legislation. The language of 
the two acts and the obligations created indicate that Congress 
recognizes an extraterritorial obligation to prevent the use of child 
soldiers. The acts sought to uphold this obligation in two ways: (1) 
by restricting military assistance to governments using child 
soldiers,100 and (2) by providing jurisdiction to U.S. federal courts to 
prosecute people thought to have recruited or used child soldiers, 
regardless of where these actions took place.101  
A. LEGISLATIVE ACTION  
The U.S. Congress passed the Child Soldiers Prevention Act and 
the Child Soldiers Accountability Act in 2008.102 They are 
progressive laws that prohibit unlawful conscription of children in 
the U.S. and seek to prevent the use of child soldiers overseas. In 
addition, these Acts promote the disarmament and reintegration of 
children who are currently fighting.  
The Child Soldiers Prevention Act prohibits the forcible 
recruitment of anyone under the age of eighteen and the voluntary 
recruitment of anyone under age fifteen.103  The Act permits the U.S. 
government to provide assistance to child soldiers overseas in their 
rehabilitation and reintegration into society.104 Most significantly, the 
 
 99. Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(c)-(c)(2)(2008); 
Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2442, 3300 (2008). 
 100. See Child Soldiers Prevention Act § 2370c-1(a) (prohibiting direct licenses 
of military equipment as well). 
 101. See Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. § 2442(c). 
 102. Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(c)-(c)(2)(2008); 
Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. § 2442 (2008). 
 103. Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. § 2442(c) (2008). 
 104. See id. § 2370c-1. 
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Child Soldiers Prevention Act provides for “Prohibition”, meaning 
that the U.S. government is prohibited from selling arms (guns, 
tanks, bullets, etc.) to any government that the United States knows 
to be using or recruiting child soldiers.105 The inclusion of this 
provision shows that Congress was concerned with the ability of the 
U.S. government to influence other states and intended for the United 
States to curb the use of child soldiers by preventing military aid. 
Unfortunately, the Child Soldiers Prevention Act also includes a 
Presidential waiver that provides that the U.S. President may waive 
the prohibition of sales of weapons to a foreign government using 
child soldiers if it “is in the national interest of the United States.”106 
This weak provision, amongst an otherwise strong bill, gives the 
President discretion on whether to uphold the United States’ 
obligation to prevent the use of child soldiers in foreign countries.  
The Child Soldiers Accountability Act provides extraterritorial 
jurisdiction for the crimes of recruiting and using child soldiers.107 
The Act criminalizes the recruitment and use of child soldiers and 
provides U.S. federal courts with jurisdiction to try anyone thought 
to have used or recruited child soldiers anywhere in the world.108 
Concerned with state sovereignty and reciprocal behavior, the U.S. 
government rarely recognizes extraterritorial obligations. Other 
exceptions include the War Crimes Act109 and the Alien Tort Claims 
Act.110 These statutes provide jurisdiction for crimes committed 
outside the U.S., but they do so only for the most egregious 
international crimes, such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and other breaches of the Geneva Conventions.111 The use 
and recruitment of child soldiers has risen to the level of such an 
egregious international crime and the United States has opened its 
courts to try perpetrators.112 This is an important step in both 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. § 2442(c) (2008). 
 108. See id. § 2442(a). 
 109. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006) (criminalizing war crimes committed by or 
against a member of the U.S. armed forces or a U.S. national). 
 110. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948) (creating jurisdiction to hear claims of 
violations of the law of nations or of U.S. treaties). 
 111. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)-(d) (2006). 
 112. But see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES TO 
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AND RESPONSE 
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stemming the use of child soldiers worldwide and showing States 
Parties that the United States will hold violators accountable.  
U.S. laws provide both for the prohibition of military assistance to 
governments using child soldiers, and grants extraterritorial 
jurisdiction for U.S. federal courts to try perpetrators. These two 
essential steps demonstrate the U.S. commitment to curbing the use 
of child soldiers outside U.S. territorial jurisdiction. 
B. CONGRESSIONAL HEARING 
To determine the intent of U.S. statutes, lawyers frequently look to 
hearings and commentary made by members of Congress regarding 
the provisions of a law. The Congressional hearings regarding the 
Child Soldiers Accountability Act and Prevention Act was held in 
2008. During the hearings, members of Congress listened to 
presentations by three people—a former girl child soldier, the 
Washington Advocacy Director of Human Rights Watch, and the 
former Chief Prosecutor for the Special Court of Sierra Leone—and 
discussed their own thoughts on the bills.113 The Representatives’ 
comments reflect the notion that the U.S. Congress understood there 
to be an extraterritorial obligation regarding the prevention of the use 
of child soldiers.114  
Representative Robert Scott, the chairman of the subcommittee, 
began with a discussion on the use of child soldiers worldwide—in 
countries other than the United States—and why that is 
unacceptable.115 He said that “this hearing will probe ways in which 
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we may, as a country, contribute to prevention and punishment of 
recruiting and using child soldiers.”116 Because the United States 
halted its practice of deploying soldiers under eighteen to combat 
zones in 2007,117 this comment refers specifically to the United 
States’ ability to prevent the use of child soldiers in other countries. 
Representative John Conyers later said, “This bill brings the power 
of the Justice Department to bear, in recognition that this is an 
offense against international law that every country has a 
responsibility to prosecute . . . .”118 Conyer’s statements that the 
crime of using child soldiers requires universal jurisdiction furthers 
the idea that the United States recognizes an extraterritorial 
obligation. 119  
C. UPHOLDING ITS OBLIGATIONS 
The United States knows which governments around the world are 
using child soldiers. In an October 2010 State Department report, the 
United States noted that six governments are currently using child 
soldiers: Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Yemen, 
Burma, and Somalia.120 The United States provides military 
assistance to four of these six countries.121 President Obama 
specifically provided the waiver to provide military assistance to 
these four countries. The United States does not provide any form of 
military aid to Burma or Somalia.122 The U.S. government notes that, 
because the Child Soldiers Prevention Act contains a waiver on the 
prohibition of military assistance, its provision of assistance is legal 
because the prohibition has been waived. The assistance, however, 
goes against the general obligations of international cooperation, 
created in the Optional Protocol, to prevent violations of the 
Protocol. By providing military assistance to countries that the 
United States knows are using child soldiers, the United States is 
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promoting violations of the Optional Protocol.  
In January 2010, the U.S. government submitted its Periodic 
Report to the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child relating to 
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.123 The report 
discusses U.S. implementation of the Optional Protocol in regards to 
military recruiting and education, judicial actions, and international 
assistance.124 The report notes that the U.S. War Crimes Statute125 
does not explicitly refer to the crime of using and recruiting child 
soldiers but that “depending upon the circumstances, the manner in 
which children are recruited, used, or treated in hostilities could 
constitute prohibited conduct under the statute.”126 The report does 
not at this point reference the Child Soldiers Prevention Act, which 
does criminalize the use of child soldiers.127  
The report also includes a section on the provision of aid in 
regards to U.S. obligations to fulfill its Article 7 international 
cooperation and assistance obligations.128 Interestingly, this aspect of 
the report focuses primarily on aid provided by USAID to foreign 
programs that promote the rehabilitation and reintegration of child 
soldiers.129 There is no mention of the prohibition of military 
assistance to countries using child soldiers. Furthermore, the report 
notes that there have been no prosecutions despite existing laws that 
provide jurisdiction for such crimes.130  
Additionally, the report includes answers to recommendations 
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made by the Committee on the Rights of the Child.131 One 
recommendation was to create an extraterritorial obligation within 
national law to try individuals using or recruiting children.132 The 
United States responded by explaining how the Child Soldiers 
Accountability Act provides jurisdiction over persons who are U.S. 
citizens or residents, stateless persons habituating in the United 
States, persons who are present in the United States, and over any 
crimes that happened partially or fully in the United States.133 This 
response acknowledges the United States’ ability to hold non-U.S. 
residents (“persons present in the U.S.”) accountable for crimes that 
happened outside of its jurisdiction, showing the United States’ 
intention to prevent further use of child soldiers overseas and to deter 
any violators from seeking refuge, or even visiting, the United 
States.134 The Committee further recommended that the United States 
become a State Party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
and the Rome Statute and that the Senate ratify various treaties on 
international humanitarian law that it has not yet accepted.135 To each 
of these recommendations, the U.S noted either that it was reviewing 
the treaty or that it had no intention of joining the convention.136  
The United States has signed and ratified the Optional Protocol 
relating to the use of child soldiers and has created national 
legislation to uphold its obligations outlined in the Protocol. These 
actions, coupled with commentary from Congressional hearings, 
show the United States’ understanding that it has an extraterritorial 
obligation to prevent the use of child soldiers and that it intends to 
uphold this obligation. However, the presidential waiver included in 
the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 deeply undermines its 
ability to uphold this obligation; the United States can provide 
military assistance to governments it specifically knows use child 
soldiers. Although the United States understands and apparently 
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intends to uphold its extraterritorial obligations, it has failed to do so 
by continuing to provide money, weapons, and training to foreign 
militaries using child soldiers.  
VII.CONCLUSION 
The international community—states, NGOs, and international 
institutions—have rejected the use of child soldiers. Most states are 
party to one of many treaties (such as the Geneva Conventions, 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, ILO 
Convention 182, and others) that prohibit the use and recruitment of 
children into armed forces. Furthermore, international legal scholars 
have acknowledged that extraterritorial obligations can be read into 
some human rights treaties. Therefore, given the egregious nature of 
the use of child soldiers and the widespread prohibition and 
prosecution for their use, states have an extraterritorial obligation to 
prevent the use of child soldiers. This means that states must not only 
prevent the use of child soldiers within their own territories, but they 
must also look beyond their territories to ensure that their actions do 
not permit or promote the use of child soldiers in other territories.  
The United States, as a State Party to the Optional Protocol 
prohibiting the use of child soldiers, created national legislation that, 
if implemented properly, would uphold its extraterritorial obligation. 
The legislation gives jurisdiction to U.S. courts to try individuals 
suspected of using or recruiting child soldiers and prohibits the U.S. 
government from providing military assistance to foreign 
governments that the United States knows is using child soldiers. In 
practice, however, the United States is not fully upholding its 
obligations. This year, President Obama waived the prohibition of 
military aid to four countries the United States knows to be using 
child soldiers. This action violates the United States’ obligations 
under international law to prevent the use of child soldiers outside of 
its territory.   
